FIRES OF 2007

Fires need 3 elements: heat, fuel and oxygen. There is no argument that the hottest summer in the northern rockies was a big factor in the 2007 fires. But 2007 is only the latest in a series of bad fire seasons. Are there causes other than weather behind these fires that seem to get worse every year? Which of the three elements can we manage and how?

Wildland fire fighting is all about reducing fire temperatures with water and removing fuels from the advancing flame front. Since we can never put enough water on a large wildfire to put it out, firefighters concentrate on slowing the fire with water while removing fuels. That is about all we can do after the fire has grown large and dangerous and the weather is working against us.

However, MFMU believes there are two things firefighters can do that they currently are not. They can work harder at putting the fire dead out while it is still small and manageable and they can work in the early hours of the morning when temperatures are lower, humidity higher and fire behavior less extreme.

Reducing the risk of catastrophic wildfire will require significant changes in policy and mindset for the forest service. In the short term, changes in firefighting policy can have immediate effects. But in the long run, forest managers must do much better at strategically reducing fire fuels and creating fire breaks

Initial attack crews on both the Skyland and Brush Creek fires were delayed by barricades or locked gates for which they had no keys. These crews should be provided with master keys or tools to open gates. Barricades or earthen berms should never be used on roads that provide primary access into large areas of 500 to 1000 acres or more. Initial attack crews should always be provided with helicopter support without delay when they ask for it. Forest Service managers should be prepared to recruit, train and field additional initial attack crews when continuing drought and weather forecasts indicate a bad fire season. Forest Service hiring policies should be streamlined to expedite hiring when fire seasons blow up. We know of several horror stories of trained and experienced fire fighters, some with their own equipment, who were unable to fight through the red tape to get to the fire lines.

Firefighters should have boots on the ground at the fire at daybreak. By 10 am, noon at the latest, the fire is heating up and becoming unworkable. We know that on many days firefighters had to pull back from the fire and either watch from a distance or go back to camp by 1 pm or earlier. While some risk is inherent in the job, no one wants firefighters to unnecessarily risk their lives. On the Brush Creek fire the morning briefing was held at 7 am, at least 2 hours after first light. By the time they got to the fire it was 8:30 or later. Yet loggers on hoot owl restrictions leave for work long before dawn so they can start at first light and get in a day’s work before they have to quit at 1 pm. Why can’t firefighters do the same? Of course they would have to leave the fire earlier - just about the same time they were forced off the fire most days. After they return to camp, a smaller crew on second shift could watch the fire and be available for emergencies or any opportunities the weather afforded. Suggestions to implement this schedule were ignored on the Brush Creek fire. As far as we know, this late start on the day is standard procedure for FS firefighters.

But it wasn't always that way. We can remember when fires were fought all night long. Old timers swear that night and early morning is the best time to fight fire. Also the FS once had a policy of "dead out by 10 am the next morning" after a fire was discovered. No more. In those days there was no waiting for contracts and recertification or training and permission to go behind gates. If there were loggers anywhere near they dropped what they were doing and went to the fire bringing their chainsaws, cats and skidders with them. And more often than now they put those fires out right away.

We suspect that the current mindset of the Forest Service is focused on fire as a tool rather than a danger to be controlled. The difference might be subtle but it plays out in a less than all out response in the early stages of the fire when the opportunity to control it is highest. As long as the fire is just burning trees and wildlife they don’t get aggressive especially if the fire is in a remote area. If the fire is in wilderness they just watch it until it breaks out of the wilderness area. That is usually too late for effective fire fighting.

Environmentalists claim that logging and fire fighting is the cause of the dangerously high levels of fire fuels we now have on most western forests. But their theories only apply to dry low altitude ponderosa forests which we don’t have a lot of here in western Montana. In this area, most natural fires are stand replacing. They don’t just burn the brush and small trees; they clear cut by fire. It is much better stewardship of the land to selectively log, leaving larger trees and removing the brush and saplings. After that the stands should be thinned from time to time to keep the fire fuels under control. Furthermore, clear cutting with fire is just as likely as logging to grow back thick with fire fuels.

Environmentalists have a quasi-religious notion that anything natural is good and anything touched by humans is bad. Appendicitis is natural but it can kill a person and that is bad. But humans have learned to treat this disease and that is good. Small controlled underburns can be good but stand replacing fires kill the forest and everything in it. Good management of forest vegetation can:

1. reduce destructive impacts of fire

2. reduce the cost of fire fighting

3. generate income for the treasury or for other forest management uses

4. promote a better local economy

5. provide the nation with wood products

6. improve forest health

7. protect public and private property.

Environmentalists have many excuses for not managing our forests but no good reasons. All of their arguments are based on incomplete or faulty science. Most of their concerns that do have some validity can be mitigated and even if they can't the minor negative impacts of active management are outweighed by the positive results.

The Forest Service claims that their hands are tied by environmental law but that is only partly true. Time and again our experience with FS reveals that they have more latitude than they admit to. FS publications endlessly repeat the mantras of environmentalists. We believe that many FS managers would rather collaborate with environmental obstructionists than agressively battle them in court.

There are signs that this agency mindset might be changing in some areas. The fires really are out of control and everyone can see that something must be done. This is our opportunity to rally public opinion to the cause of active forest management and multiple use.

There is an increasing concern about fire costs and how to lower or at least contain them. There is no mystery about why fire suppression costs are rising. There are more large fires to fight than in previous decades. The USFS, other federal and state agencies as well as environmentalists have been pointing the finger at the WUI (Wildland/Urban Interface) They say it costs more to fight fire in the WUI. This irrational conclusion flies in the face of common sense. The WUI is closer to support infrastructure for fire fighters. It has more roads which act as fire breaks. These same roads increase fire fighting effectiveness by speeding fire crews to new fires or outbreaks of old ones. The WUI has been logged more heavily and if the logging units have been managed properly by thinning they too will slow or stop fires.

If fires start in the WUI they are far more likely to be put out quickly. This brings us to the real reason why fire fighting costs rise as the fires approach the residential area of the WUI. Simply put - they are fought harder. More fire crews, more aviation, more money. If fires far from the WUI were fought with the same urgency as they are closer in, they would not grow as large and they would be put out sooner at a lower cost.

We suspect that the real agenda of many who blame private property owners who want to live in forested areas for the rising cost of fires is to enact regulations on that land and ultimately force people out of the WUI and into the cities. But there will always be a WUI somewhere. The best cost saving solution is to control the fires and fire fuels instead of controlling private property.

The next chart is for the Flathead Forest only and does not include state or private lands. The data comes from FNF monitoring reports and other FNF sources as well as National Incident Command Center (fire). There is a data gap for fire acres for 1990 and 1991 but we know there were was very little fire on the Flathead in those years. While accurate for the Flathead NF, the chart does not adequately depict the very bad fire year of 1988, the year of the Yellowstone fires which burnt over a million acres in and around Yellowstone NP. That same year the Red Bench fire burnt from the North Fork of the Flathead into Glacier NP. It was a large fire but more acres burnt in Glacier than on the Flathead NF

It also interesting to note that fire cuts far more acres of timber than logging. Not only that but it generally does so by clearcutting.  

Notice that the decades from the 30s to the 80s were relatively fire free. This same pattern is shown on a map of fire acres in 11 western states for the same period. While many of the worst fire decades and years coincide with drought years there are notable exceptions. The 1910 fire in northern Idaho and western Montana burnt over 3 million acres. 1910 was only a moderately dry year in this area and the years preceding were wet years. It is also remarkable that there were few fires in the dust bowl years of the 1930s or the extended drought of the 50s. These were also dry years in NW Montana. Drought is only one factor in causing large fires. Another cause that may be more important is the long term buildup of fire fuels. Fire fighting policy is another factor influencing fire behavior. We believe that the new aggressive fire fighting policy that resulted from the 1910 fire combined with reduced fuels from the remaining after the fires of 1910 and earlier caught up with wildland fire behavior in the 30s and with the help of active logging from the 60s through the 80s continued to reduce wildland fire until a less agressive fire fighting policy and reduced logging combined with drought resulting in raging fires in this new millenia.