"It does not require a majority to prevail, 
but rather an irate, tireless minority keen to set brush fires in people's minds."
 --Samuel Adams - Leader in our Fight for Independence

Moose Fire Review

 A Public Review of the Moose Creek Fire 


National Forest, National Park, and Private Land
August - October of 2001

Review Date: November 7, 2001

Review Sponsored By: 
Montanans For Multiple Use
P.O. Box 3050
Columbia Falls, MT 59912

Review Panel Participants:

Lee Downs, Private Land Owner

Arthur (Duke) Hoiland, Private Land Owner

Jim Dupont, Flathead County Sheriff

Gary Mahugh, Consultant & Volunteer Fire Chief

James A. Slack, Heavy Equip. Contractor

Jon A.Dahlberg, DNRC, NW Area Forest Supv.

Ronald Buentemeier, Land Mgr., Stoltze Land & Lumber.

Tom Weaver, Fishery Biologist, MFW&P

Jeff Forbes, Chief of Staff, U.S. Senator Max Baucus

Alan Mikkelsen, Resource Staff, Congressman Rehberg

Julie Altumus, Field Repr., U.S. Senator Conrad Burns

Dale Williams, Chrm., Flathead County Commissioner

Clarice Ryan, Organizational & Educational Liaison

Fred Hodgeboom, Forestry Consultant, Tree Farmer

& USFS planner, retired

 

Written by:

Chuck Samuelson, USFS retired, Œ85

for Montanans For Multiple Use

from review notes, personal inservice experience,

with history and commentary

 

MOOSE FIRE REVIEW

Executive Statement

A critique meeting was called by Montanans for Multiple Use on November 7 to address the causes, problems, fire management procedures and proposed solutions in relation to the "Moose fire" which occurred in Northwest Montana during August & September of 2001. A panel of 16 specialists, community leaders, elected officials and participants in this fire were called together to participate on panel discussions addressing these issues. The problems of U.S. forest mismanagement, overgrowth, fuel build-up, disease and bug-infestation were noted originating in federal lands and ultimately causing problems for adjoining forests. The complexity of fire management became apparent due to federal, state, county and private lands all being involved leaving in question the power of authority and command as well as the qualifications necessary to do the job. Furthermore, and most significant, in observing federal command performance and procedures, an obvious "let burn" objective was in place.

Exorbitant costs of fire-fighting, loss of natural resources and revenues were identified. On-going post-fire problems are anticipated concerning water-shed, mud-slides, water pollution and restoration costs. Extensive deterioration in value of salvage timber and forest restoration is almost assured due to federal procedures and red tape lasting a year or more, while state sales and forest treatment are already underway.

As details came to light the origin of problems consistently reflected back to the impact of the Endangered Species Act of 1973 and its strangle-hold on federal policy-making. The ESA is determining the objectives and procedures for USFS management of the forests, their level of multiple use and the degree of access by the American public. The ESA also initiates rules and regulations through various channels concerning state and private lands. The ESA grants the USFWS and National Marine Fisheries Service unlimited authority to write management standards which apply to all Federal lands and Agencies. The cumulative effect of all these standards results in no management of Federal lands. As a result, Federal Forests have grown so thick they they pose the worst fire hazard ever. Ironically a catastrophic fire of this magnitude and intensity ultimately destroys in a dramatically destructive manner, now and for decades to come, the very endangered species and their habitats that the act was designed to protect, as well as threatening neighboring lives and property. This also destroys the value of these forests originally set aside for use and enjoyment of the citizens who own them and are best qualified to protect and preserve them for the betterment of humans, the wildlife and the environment.

The meeting concluded with a request to the congressional representatives present as well as the county commissioner to recommend solutions for anticipated, on-going forest fire problems here in Montana and throughout the country. Solutions included revisions to ESA for removal of unilateral authority for US wildlife and fish agencies to issue Biological Opinions which have the force of law. Revise the Equal Access to Justice Act to remove no risk appeal and litigation rights of non-profit corporations. Restore NEPA categorical exclusion authority. Exempt fire salvage from appeals and litigation. Provide incentives for the Forest Service to implement management practices.

It was felt that the analysis and accountability to the tax-paying public provided by this public review has great merit and is a recommended post-fire strategy.

Background:

The Moose Fire review took place on Nov. 7, 2001, and was sponsored and organized by Montanans For Multiple Use. The primary purpose was to review events and actions on the fire for the benefit of the public and representatives of agencies involved, private citizens, and elected officials from the county, state, and federal levels who were involved or deserve to learn of some of events taking place on the Moose Fire. It was meant to be a constructive review. The Moose Fire destroyed watersheds, wildlife and wildlife habitat including almost as much timber as has ever been harvested on National Forest Lands in the North Fork Flathead River. The fire ran up over 20 million dollars in suppression and rehabilitation cost. This is a large detriment to the forested mountainous lands, the national and local economy and a direct cost and loss to the citizen taxpayer.

In the politics of today, it seems that responsibility and accountability by federal government agencies has little meaning and bears no consequences to anyone responsible and involved. No one is responsible or assumes responsibility. If public pressure is too strong, a defense is established. Investigative reviews are not taken or if taken are dragged out endlessly so that they become meaningless through the protracted process. Such actions proliferate and continue on and on to the detriment of the nation, citizen taxpayer, and the government agencies themselves. Problems are not solved, only compounded.

The Moose Fire was reported as discovered on August 14, 2001 and burned into October 2001. The fire burned approximately 71,000 acres with 96 miles of fire perimeter. Area burned is; National Forest (37,000 acres), National Park (24,000 acres), State of Montana’s Coal Cr. Forest (6,500 acres), and private land (941 acres). The fire’s base camp, located on the outskirts of Columbia Falls, MT, was a comfortable community within itself with all the amenities. Burned area rehabilitation is being conducted and will require several years of continued work. Rehab costs will continue to be incurred for an unknown time adding to the $20 million cost. Costs are borne by the U.S. taxpayers.

The Forest Service no longer fights fire around the clock. The time clock hours were 0700 hours to 1900 hours, or a 12 hour day. This day shift only regime is inefficient. It makes the whole fire suppression effort exceedingly costly beyond common sense. It also adds to the size of the burned area. Never before in the history of the U.S. Forest Service has wildland fire fighting been a 0700 to 1900 job. The Forest Service is terrified of risk even though there will always be risk to wild land firefighters. The risk is actually greater during the daytime burning period. The Forest Service should analyze fatalities/million man hours, day vs. night, but they don’t seem to use facts to support their decisions these days.

Some hazard trees along roads within the fire area have been cut and sold for saw timber. Any further timber salvage and removal will be subjected to about one year of study, plan writing, contract preparation, inevitable appeals and lawsuits which could exceed far more than a year of time. Burned timber requires removal before the next summers dry season to maintain a marketable value. The tactic to thwart and stall the sale of salvageable saw timber is the usual goal of the "zero cut" environmental organizations. Hundreds of thousands of taxpayers dollars are wasted in planning so we are assured of the no action alternative effects. The environmental conflict industry can claim more deficit sales by the U.S. Forest Service.

The State of Montana’s Dept. of Natural Resources Lands burned in the Bitterroot Fires of the summer of 2000 were acted upon immediately. Salvage timber sales were prepared, sold, and the burned timber was removed in the winter following the burn thus minimizing loss of value and maximizing a return to State School Trust Funds.

An inservice fire review of the Moose Fire by the federal and state government agencies has not been held and there is apparently none planned or announced. This suggests that the U.S. Forest Service and the National Park Service do not wish to address the issue which could enable them to perform more efficiently in future fire incidents. It is absolutely inconceivable that a critique and thorough review would not be conducted for the agencies own benefit.

 

The Review: 

The review consisted of three (3) tables of participants.

The first table consisted of two private land owners who had property in the direct path of the fire, the Flathead County Sheriff, who has ultimate responsibility for the protection of private property and citizens within the County, the Incident Commander for County Volunteer Fire Depts. who were organized to assist in protection of private land and structures and under control of the County Sheriff and County Emergency Services, and a local heavy equipment contractor who was hired by the Forest Service for the primary purpose of building fireline, opening closed roads or other work requiring heavy mechanized equipment for suppression purposes.

One of the private landowners had two separate properties involved in the fire. His buildings were saved by the County Volunteer Firefighters. This landowner is basically a life long resident of the North Fork, knows the North Fork and the lands intimately and also knows wildland fire from long experience. He operates his own tree farm, or now what is left of it. The two private landowners are convinced that the Moose Fire was a "let burn fire" but was not openly declared by the Forest Service. He stated that there was "too much evidence of a fire that was being allowed to burn". They were also convinced that had an effort been made, the fire could have and should have been stopped within a week of the start on Aug. 14th.

Flathead County Sheriff Jim Dupont spoke next and explained his role and the County role in the Moose Fire with the primary duty of providing safety and protection for private property and human life. In that role, Flathead County organized a fire fighting force of Flathead Valley Volunteer Firefighters, fire engines and related equipment. The Volunteers were under the immediate direction of an Incident Commander (fire boss or chief). This position was held by Gary Mahugh, Chief of the Creston, MT, Volunteer Fire Dept.. This force had other Deputy’s and the head of Emergency Services all working as a team for support of property and human safety purposes.

The County team fireproofed numerous private structures and one Forest Service bridge on the Coal Creek Road which was overrun by the wildfire and was consequently saved. Volunteers built and cleared fireline around structures and other defensible spaces, performed fire hose lays and suppression work. Also fireproofing numerous individual structures. Their work continued for weeks with virtually no break.

Volunteer Incident Commander Mahugh elaborated on Sheriff Dupont’s testimony.

Sheriff Dupont explained that the U.S. Forest Service had offered to take command and control of the Volunteer forces and their equipment on the Moose Fire. This proposal was adamantly refused by the Sheriff and also with adamant concurrence of the Flathead County Commissioners.

For clarification, individual County Fire District’s can supply manpower and equipment to operate off of their respective Fire Districts but have a standing responsibility to be able to still provide protection to their home district and its taxpayers who finance each individual fire district. Flathead County Fire Districts have had mutual aid agreements among all fire districts for many years.

Sheriff Dupont rightfully refused to delegate the County’s strike team resources to the command and control of the federal fire incident commander. This apparently "ruffled some feathers of the federal officials". Sheriff Dupont also stated, "the fire cost $20 million dollars and what do we have but a lot of burned forest". Flathead County has incurred about $300,000 through their actions to protect life and property as a result of the Moose Fire.

Volunteer Incident Commander Mahugh said local firefighters, along with some landowners are "the only reason that some of those structures are up there", referring to the structures of private land owners. Mahugh also stated that when the first homes were threatened, the Moose Fire Incident Commander ordered the county forces to evacuate. "We refused to leave and continued operations". Federal forces did leave the area.

The next first table panel member is a local native of long standing. A timber and construction industry operator who had crawler tractor dozers and excavator type equipment along with two other loggers who each had contracted to the Forest Service for the purpose of constructing fireline and the clearing and removal of timber in fireline construction. His comment was that a lot of time was spent waiting for instructions and that members of a federal southeastern U.S. fire overhead team had told him that they had been restricted in their ability to use heavy equipment to construct fireline. The contractor’s were not allowed to put their equipment to work on the line even when the fire was only 20 to 150 acres and could have been contained with dozer lines. This statement supports the private landowners statement that they saw "too much evidence of a fire that was being allowed to burn".

The second panel table consisted of two Flathead Forest officials who gave a quick rundown of the Moose Fire and ongoing rehabilitation work in the Moose Fire area. They also spent time explaining actions during the fire and attempting to refute some of the statements of other panel members giving testimony. The Forest Service officials gave no details of suppression actions prior to the District turning the management of the Moose Fire over to the Werner Peak Fire Team.

Others at the table were the State of Montana Forest Supervisor for the Northwest Montana Forests belonging to the State. As previously stated, the State of Montana lost 6,500 acres of their Coal Creek State Forest to the Moose Fire. This is roughly one half of the State Unit of School Trust Lands in the North Fork.

The State Supervisor stated that before the smoke cleared that his team was surveying the area and preparing to put together an environmental analysis. Their plans are to prepare sales of the areas totally destroyed and to have the sales hopefully sold and logged this first winter and working over the snow to lessen impacts on the soils. Following that the intentions are to survey the areas that have some trees that may survive in order to leave the live trees and harvest those trees that are going to die or have obviously been killed by the fire. The State is also performing fire area rehabilitation.

The next panel member at the second table was a fisheries biologist from the Montana Fish Wildlife and Parks. His team was doing stream surveys in the burned area before the smoke settled. He stated there were fish losses in the fire area but the streams have sufficient "seed stock" to eventually recover. Sediment is and will be a problem, especially in spring runoff. Many miles of riparian areas were completely burned off. This will add to sediment in runoff and has removed important shade to the streams.

From a recent news article the redd counts (nests) for the threatened bull trout has been taken and remains stable. The exception is of upper Coal Creek above the burned area where there are no redds. This has been attributed to sediment.

A question and answer period was afforded to the audience who submitted written questions on cards.

The last panel, the solutions panel, at the third table included three representatives of the U.S. Congressional delegation. A retired U.S. Forest Service Forester who was one of the writers of the current l986 Flathead National Forest Plan which is suppose to be in effect. A former business person with an energy background. And Flathead County Commissioner Dale Williams.

Commissioner Williams points were: 1. Revise the Endangered Species Act. Place human and economic elements on par with plants and animals. 2. De-emphasize the roles of the U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service and the National Marine Fisheries Service under the Endangered Species Act. 3. Provide a salvage exclusionary rider for salvage of burned area timber and timber killed by insects and disease. 4. Laws are needed to prevent establishing de-facto wilderness areas without public or congressional scrutiny. 5. Require a bond for an appeal of any Forest Service proposed project. A bond in value to the project value.

Problems and solutions listed during the review:

Problems:

1. Slow initial attack response and an apparent let burn attitude of responsible agencies.

2. Insects were active and moving into burned area during and following fire.

3. Forest Service underestimated fires potential even though their own maps show high hazard fuels.

4. Too many changes in fire overhead and supervisory command team.

5. Conflicts between federal and local command personnel.

6. Did not adequately anchor the fires burned areas with firelines.

7. No internal review of fire tactics and fire costs.

8. Loss of habitat and wildlife including ESA listed species to fire

Solutions:

1. Keep burn areas in an emergency status for salvage of burned trees and for land rehabilitation work.

2. Reinstate the categorical exclusion section of the National Environmental Policy Act.

3. Consider removal of unburned fire fuels for use as biomass for power generation when facilities are available.

4. Policy changes (national) need to come from the U.S. Congress. May take presidents executive orders.

5. Appeals to National Forest projects should require bonds equal to a projected value of the project appealed.

6. Initial attack of wildland fires needs more priority and concentrated efforts and consideration.

7. Fuels reduction in all forest areas and in burned over areas.

8. More utilization of local forest fire suppression talents.

9. Burned trees - old growth trees burned should not be considered old growth. Most should be considered for salvage.

10. Automatic review for larger fires, fire situation, fiscal review and protocol reviews.

11. Revise the Endangered Species Act to remove authority of the USFWS and NMFS to issue "biological opinions" with no environmental, economic or social analysis, no public or peer review, and no accountability for effects of implementation.

12. Revise Equal Access to Justice Law to introduce some accountability to non-profit corporations who now abuse their "low to no cost, no risk" status to file endless appeals and lawsuits. These corporations are big business and they should have to post bonds to delay expensive Federal projects, and they should have to pay the public costs when they can’t prove up frivolous claims in court.

Conclusions:

The U.S. Forest Service no longer has the capability to manage the National Forests and especially to provide sufficient experienced and qualified supervisory fire overhead positions on a local basis to adequately control wildfires once a fire escapes initial attack. Esprit de corps and a "can do" attitude in any form within the service no longer exists.

The Flathead National Forest and the U.S. Forest Service has a history of nearly 100 years of wildland fire fighting and in the dirt forest management. During that period much experience has been gained that resulted in strong policy related to wildland firefighting and suppression action with strong emphasis towards personal safety. For many years the primary goal was to attack fires while they were small and keep them small or "fight fire aggressively but provide for safety first". This historical reservoir of experience is now being underused or ignored.

In today’s U.S. Forest Service, the District Rangers are predominately not professional foresters or even experienced in forestry or forest management. They have wildlife, recreation, or some other unknown degree.

Employees are no longer required to have or gain fire experience or qualifications to assist in fireline activities. The experienced and qualified firefighters are greying and retiring.

Esprit de corps in the service, which existed in the past among the fire suppression crews of the adjoining and various Ranger Districts, may now only exist in organized fire crews. It was a building block of strong organizations and those of past fire crews always took pride in going to someone else’s fire and performing with pride.

Since about 1985, the U.S. Forest Service has changed the course of the service from active forest management to a passive do little or nothing agency.

The change of course has been brought about by continuous litigation resulting from the Endangered Species Act. The ESA is enforced by the Dept. of Interior, U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service has control and approves all project actions of the Forest Service.

 

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